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“Smart” Repression
Lee A .  Smithey a nd Lester R.  Kurtz
Repression by authorities against challengers has become an increas-
ingly common subject of study among scholars of social movements. 
Most of us are familiar with newspaper photos and videos of protest-
ers being attacked with water hoses, dogs, or chemicals, or beaten by 
helmeted baton-wielding police officers, or even shot by riot-gear-
clad law enforcement. Indeed, many of the most iconic pictures of 
social movements capture moments of shocking repression. Vicious 
attacks on demonstrators often backfire, however, if the repression is 
seen as unjust or disproportionate, bringing shame on the regime and 
increased support for the movement (Smithey and Kurtz 1999).
It is not only scholars of social movements who have become 
increasingly aware of this paradox of repression, but also some author-
ities who are confronting social movements in ways that attempt to 
avoid the backfire that so often accompanies repression. In this chap-
ter, we turn our attention to that phenomenon: the increasing use 
by elites of what we call “smart” repression—that is, the use of tactics 
by authorities that are deliberately crafted to demobilize movements 
while mitigating or eliminating a backfire effect. Some may initially 
find the concept of smart repression confounding or even unsettling. 
The term is meant to invoke the same paradox that one finds in refer-
ences to technology, such as “smart” bombs (precision-guided muni-
tions), which military experts argue reduce collateral damage and 
make warfare more effective strategically and acceptable politically. 
Authorities use smart repression to frame or even forestall dramatic 
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confrontations that might undermine their legitimacy. By modulat-
ing away from the most heavy-handed tactics, such methods attempt 
to make popular mobilization less likely, either by making repression 
incrementally less outrageous or by invoking familiar norms (such as 
law and order) to make resistance literally unthinkable or unpalat-
able. In both cases, the ability of authorities to maintain legitimacy is 
paramount.
Sometimes the repression of dissidents by the state—even if vio-
lent—is considered legitimate because of the state’s unique institu-
tional role. German sociologist Max Weber ([1920] 1978) famously 
asserted that what distinguishes the state is its claim to the legitimate 
use of physical force within a given territory. His dictum seems to have 
become more prevalent as the preservation of law and order becomes 
increasingly militarized. As police officers adopt the clothing, protec-
tive gear, and weapons of soldiers, they look and respond less and less 
like the “peace officers” they were once considered to be (see Birming-
ham and Vitale 2011).
Christian Davenport (1995) looked at the question of when regimes 
decide to use negative sanctions against social movements, examin-
ing fifty-three states in a time series analysis from 1948 to 1993. He 
concluded that the decision by political leaders to repress dissent was 
related not so much to the frequency of challenges as to the variety of 
strategies used by dissidents to challenge governmental authority and 
whether the regime was democratic (democracies being less likely to 
impose negative sanctions). Davenport (1995, 702) found that “regimes 
are more inclined to respond repressively to deviance from the cul-
tural norm and multiple strategies of mass political behavior. In these 
situations, the regime has to confront conflict that is in violation of 
its code of acceptable dissent as well as confront different strategies of 
political conflict, each with its own method of recruitment and impact 
upon the domestic political economy.” What Davenport (2007) calls 
the “punishment puzzle” is not easily answered: why do “governments 
respond to behavioral threats with some form of repression despite 
lack of evidence that repressive behavior is effective at quelling dis-
sent” (Davenport and Inman 2012, 630)? This question is not our 
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focus here, but it is relevant because to counter repression or its effects 
it is helpful to know what causes the repression. It might be, some sug-
gest, that authorities have to act but have limited options in their rep-
ertoire (Davenport and Inman 2012; Kalyvas 2003; Valentino, Huth, 
and Balch-Lindsay 2004; Ackerman and DuVall 2000).
However, regimes are not held in place simply by brute force, as 
Gandhi (1999) observed, but by the cooperation of their subjects (forced 
or otherwise). In recent years, we have observed both increased vio-
lent repression (and technologies of repression) but also an increase in 
smart repression, which includes the modulation of tactical responses 
by authorities to maximize their ability to demobilize social move-
ments while avoiding the public outrage that violence can evoke.
Authorities sometimes focus on low-risk tactics, just as dissidents 
do. Moreover, in the classic carrot-stick tension, regimes reward coop-
eration while they sanction dissidence. As nonviolent civil resistance 
becomes a major force in contemporary geopolitics, however, a num-
ber of regimes have searched for new techniques of repression in an 
effort to outsmart nonviolent dissidents, who are those most likely to 
create conditions fertile for the backfire effect.
Such elite strategies increasingly involve intelligence gathering 
about movement organizations that resembles Foucault’s ([1975] 2012, 
221) concept of “disciplinary techniques” in which the “traditional,
ritual, costly, violent forms of power .  .  . fell into disuse and were
superseded by a subtle, calculated technology of subjection.” Indeed,
the original French title of Foucault’s 1975 book was Surveiller et
Punier: Naissance de la Prison, literally “to watch and punish,” which
implies the same kind of rational investigative approach to resistance
campaigns—as opposed to raw repression—that we address later in
this chapter.
Smart repression is not limited to political regimes but can also be 
found in the corporate world—as evidenced by public relations spe-
cialist Denise Deegan’s (2001) handbook Managing Activism: A Guide 
to Dealing with Activists and Pressure Groups, written to help organi-
zations plan for—and mitigate the effects of—“activist attacks.” Her 
introduction begins by bemoaning the negative impact of activists 
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on corporations like Shell, which was forced to spend £38.5 million 
extra on disposing of a sea rig because of Greenpeace’s campaigns, 
and McDonald’s, which was compelled to spend 10 million pounds 
in court costs suing activists accusing the company of animal rights 
abuse and exploitation of workers. Deegan advises not to counter with 
force, but to prepare for and respond to activists intelligently: “if dealt 
with in the right manner, activists have been shown to change their 
approach from aggressively confrontational to cooperative” (2–3). She 
argues that, by understanding and negotiating with activists, it is pos-
sible to both influence their strategies and demobilize them.
In an intriguing and escalating contest, both regimes and dis-
sidents often seek to outsmart the other with regard to repression. 
How do regimes and other elites (like corporate officers) try to prevent 
the backfire effect with smart repression, and how do resisters try to 
anticipate such measures in order to cultivate defections and support 
for the movement?
Brute Force versus Smart Repression
Here we find an interesting divergence: even as authorities continue 
to use physical force and violence, ranging from massive police efforts 
to herd and sweep up protesters to the use of live ammunition, we also 
perceive a growing awareness of authorities regarding the limitations 
of such tactics. Regimes have come a long way since the British Raj 
was caught off guard by Gandhi and the Indian independence move-
ment. Authorities seem to be increasingly conscious of the thresholds 
across which physical force repression may backfire. Perhaps they 
always have been, but there is little research that reveals in any quali-
tative way how authorities make difficult decisions about the use of 
repression. The literature on repression focuses on instances of physi-
cal force or intimidation by security forces but tends to ignore deliber-
ate efforts by authorities to avoid provoking backfire.
Although students of movements usually focus on the protester 
perspective, the other crucial side of the contest has been addressed 
by some scholars. Goldstone and Tilly (2001), for example, argue that 
authorities seek to combine repression and concession in ways that are 
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most likely to pacify an opposition movement. Tarrow (2003, 149) says 
that regimes can use a strategy of “selective facilitation and repres-
sion” to drive wedges between moderates and radicals, what Haines 
(1984) calls the “radical flank” question (cf. Schock and Chenoweth 
2010). This narrative that labels one group of insurgents as radical and 
the other moderate is a common tactic of elites (see Alridge 2006), 
who have a clear preference for dealing with one group rather than the 
other, which is why President Johnson would invite Dr. King, but not 
Malcolm X, to the White House. Mistrust sometimes emerges within 
a resistance movement as moderates are seen to have sold out to the 
powers that be. Examining cases from the Nonviolent and Violent 
Campaigns and Outcomes (NAVCO) data set comparing violent and 
nonviolent campaigns (see Chenoweth and Stephan 2011; Stephan and 
Chenoweth 2008), Schock and Chenoweth (2010) found that, when 
a radical flank existed, nonviolent campaigns were less likely to suc-
ceed. Radicals, freed from the moderating influence of their former 
comrades, are more likely to use violence and create a plausible excuse 
for further repression of all dissent by the authorities. In this way, 
authorities sometimes can shift the thresholds of public outrage to 
avoid the paradox of repression. This clever use of selective facilitation 
and repression suggests authorities can be quite aware of the risks of 
overt repression and appreciate the important subjective dimensions 
of repression and protest within which the fundamental battle over 
legitimacy is waged.
A Continuum of Demobilization
If we are to understand the paradox of repression, we also need to 
explore how elites sometimes attempt to avoid triggering it. There 
is some evidence—although it is obviously difficult to get accurate 
information—that intelligence and military agencies are attempting 
to construct tactics of smart repression.1 This chapter represents our 
1. Not all of these efforts are covert, however—in fact, Eric L. Nelson (2013)
has explored “the intentional subversion of social movements by agents of the 
190 | Lee A .  Smithey a n d Lester R .  K u rtz
initial foray into a deeper consideration of repression and whether the 
paradoxical dynamic that is often called backfire operates in the same 
way across a variety of forms of repression, a topic taken up fruitfully 
by Jennifer Earl (2003, 47), who suggested looking at “three key theo-
retical dimensions of repression . . . (1) the identity of the repressive 
agent; (2) the character of the repressive action; and (3) whether the 
repressive action is observable.”
Keeping those elements in mind but focusing on the second and 
third, we suggest, as a point of departure, that a continuum of demo-
bilization (Table 8.1) ranges from the most violent forms that rely on 
inducing fear among challengers and potential movement partici-
pants, on the one hand, to intentional attempts to encourage people 
to internalize a regime’s legitimacy, on the other. We expect the type 
of repression used to affect the dynamics of a conflict and the prob-
ability of its backfiring on the regime. As one moves to the right of the 
continuum in Table 8.1, one encounters less direct threat, violence, 
and intimidation and a diminishing likelihood of public outrage and 
mobilization.
We propose that this continuum represents a range of attempts 
employed by movement opponents to demobilize protest. Nodes to 
the left of the continuum align more strongly with traditional ideas 
about repression, while nodes toward the right represent attempts to 
induce self censorship among would-be activists by disseminating 
privileged narratives that favor authorities and become internalized 
in the general populace (see Gramsci 1998). Whether these activities 
should always be defined as repression remains unclear.
organization upon which the social movement is trying to force change” (163). 
He reviews “thirteen tested and theoretical methods of subversion .  .  . [that] were 
designed to induce petit or grand failure into targeted social movements” (172), some 
of which we discuss below. It is interesting to note that Nelson explicitly avoids dis-
cussing the morality or appropriateness of these types of deliberate subversion of 
a movement, concluding with a warning that “organizational attorneys should be 
consulted before any subversive program is implemented” (172).
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Overt Violence
The most dramatic forms of repression that attract the bulk of media 
and popular attention include instances of public physical force: assas-
sinations and executions, baton charges and beatings, arrests, water 
jets, dogs, and the iconic example of live fire injuring or even killing 
demonstrators. Overt violence can have the functional effect of remov-
ing protesters from the streets as they are incapacitated or arrested 
and removed to detention facilities. However, its primary effect is 
deterrence—it lies in provoking fear and making an example of a few 
in order to inhibit the participation of others in protest. Although this 
is the most likely type of repression to provoke backfire, it can also 
sometimes actually demobilize or even extinguish a movement that 
is unable to manage the repression effectively, as did the June 4, 1989 
massacre at Tiananmen Square in Beijing, which effectively shut down 
the Chinese movement at that time. Movement leaders slipped under-
ground or into exile, and demonstrators learned to self censor for fear 
of harsh repercussions.
Authorities who anticipate using overt violence to demobilize a 
movement may prepare for the use of force in order to mitigate its 
negative effects. Here we may see something like a macro-level use of 
what social psychologist Albert Bandura (1999) identifies as “mecha-
nisms of moral disengagement” that individuals use to justify to them-
selves the prospect of harming others, and to avoid self-sanctioning 
for engaging in behavior people know is morally wrong. In this case, it 
is not so much the belief that violent repression is wrong, although that 
may be part of the thinking of at least some law enforcement, security, 
or military personnel. What is most significant is their wish to avoid 
the stigma of engaging in behavior that may be defined as unjust or 
disproportionate on the part of significant segments of the public, or 
even elites or other members of the security forces. The psychologi-
cal consequences of the use of violent repression by authorities and 
their agents—what Rachel MacNair (2002) refers to as Perpetration 
Induced Traumatic Stress (PITS)—may also inhibit elites’ use of vio-
lent repression (see chapter 4 in this volume).
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Authorities may therefore try to deflect criticism before, during, 
or after the use of violence by dehumanizing its targets, using euphe-
misms or advantageous comparisons (if we do not do this, something 
even worse will happen), blaming the victim, or otherwise discounting 
the negative consequences of violence (Martin 2007, 134–35). Much of 
this repression management (see Smithey and Kurtz 2010) may be car-
ried out through statements to the press about the danger potentially 
faced by dissidents if they are not demobilized. They may be margin-
alized or even dehumanized, stigmatized, labeled, and referred to in 
derogatory terms, tactics we will discuss in more detail below.
Studies of violence by Stanley Milgram (1974) and Grossman and 
Siddle (2008) show that it is easier to harm others when one is physi-
cally or psychologically removed from the victim and operating under 
instructions from authorities. Sometimes the targeting of more vul-
nerable groups in a society by law enforcement (either deliberately or 
as a result of systematic discrimination and the makeup of the police 
force) may sustain a greater degree of ongoing control over those 
populations. That may also backfire, however, as the wave of protests 
starting in 2014 against the killing of African Americans by US police 
officers demonstrates. Smart tactics of repression will take these kinds 
of dynamics into account.
“Less-lethal” Methods
Interestingly, many military and domestic police forces are increas-
ingly interested in what the US military calls “non-lethal” or “less-
lethal” methods for controlling dissidents, including plastic bullets 
and baton rounds, tasers, pepper spray, and ways of moving individu-
als or crowds of people. This may be especially helpful to authorities 
in democratic countries where their actions are under more effective 
scrutiny, and even more so when an independent press can disseminate 
information about repression and potentially cultivate what Gamson 
(1992) calls an “injustice frame” (see Benford and Snow 2000).
Perhaps, in part, because of the dangers of PITS, as well as a 
consciousness of the bad press generated by lethal methods, soldiers 
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have generated a demand for less-lethal options that can help reduce 
instances of civilian casualties. The US Joint Non-Lethal Weapons 
Directorate in Quantico, Virginia, oversees the US military’s research 
and development in the field. According to the program’s website, 
the “Department of Defense defines non-lethal weapons as weap-
ons, devices, and munitions that are explicitly designed and primarily 
employed to incapacitate targeted personnel or materiel immediately, 
while minimizing fatalities, permanent injury to personnel, and unde-
sired damage to property in the target area or environment. Non-
lethal weapons are intended to have reversible effects on personnel 
and materiel” (Non-Lethal Weapons Program, US Department of 
Defense 2013).
Military contractors have developed an “Active Denial System,” a 
device that emits electromagnetic energy that creates a painful sensa-
tion in a human target but allegedly does no lasting physical harm. 
The “Mobility Denial System” involves a nearly frictionless viscous 
fluid that makes it virtually impossible to walk or drive. Conversely, 
another method involves a sticky gluelike substance that can be dis-
persed to impede targets’ mobility. Other devices fire rubber pellets, 
sponge projectiles, or plasma energy to repel or deter their targets 
(Mihm 2004).
Non- or less-lethal methods are presumably attractive to security 
forces because they spare the user from the traumatic psychological 
effects of committing violence and help minimize the public relations 
fallout associated with more violent methods. That said, the impact 
of non-lethal methods on public perception may vary from context 
to context, including the extent to which a movement is able to frame 
the use of these methods and the way they are portrayed in the media. 
The use of non-lethal weapons like pepper spray and tear gas, along 
with nighttime raids to clear encampments, backfired in the case of 
the Occupy movement. Images of pepper-spraying officers went viral 
on the Internet, and TV commentator Keith Olbermann unleashed 
a satirical diatribe against New York Mayor Bloomberg, comparing 
him and Police Commissioner Raymond Kelly with other historical 
and ruthless US officials, such as Governor Wallace, who used tactical 
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police violence in attempts to shut down civil rights and antiwar move-
ments in the 1960s (Olbermann 2011).
Intimidation
Intimidation often amounts to the threat of direct violence, which 
may be physical, verbal, or written, but also includes such tactics as 
harassment, surveillance, tax investigations, and other subtle efforts to 
demobilize activists without the use of direct violence. While clinging 
to the option of violence under a claim of legitimacy (manufactured 
or not), security officials are also at least roughly aware of the costs of 
using direct violence. Most would prefer to deter popular resistance 
without actually using violence.2 Consequently, they project strength 
through deploying superior numbers, displaying weapons, and wear-
ing body armor. Nevertheless, walking the line between effective 
repression and repression that backfires requires a fine calibration of 
threat, and thus activities that fall toward the right end of our con-
tinuum (Table 8.1) become important in providing a wider range of 
options to facilitate repression management by authorities.
Nelson (2013, 170) suggests that intimidation can involve either 
overt actions (which, of course, run the risk of backfire) or “less 
overt acts such as threats to sue, arrest, and evict. It can also be more 
subtle, with implications left to the target’s imagination.” He iden-
tifies more subtle forms of intimidation or even overt surveillance. 
Sometimes community or civil relations officers in more familiar uni-
forms are deployed to mitigate or modulate intimidatory measures. 
Nelson notes that “vehicles with agents parked in front of a target’s 
residence, or place of work, and publicly following that person can 
be unnerving” (170). Authorities can also attempt to avoid the para-
dox of repression by short-circuiting the confrontations they feel call 
for repression through indirect threat and redirection. If few people 
2. This is a ubiquitous preference in warfare and violent conflict (Grossman and
Siddle 2008; Collins 2008; Waal 2000). Individual combatants often “posture” to 
avoid or at least postpone actual violence.
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attend contentious events, the popularity of the movement is dimin-
ished, protesters appear increasingly marginal and out-of-step with 
the public, and there may be fewer witnesses to direct repression when 
it occurs (depending on how well the media covers the event).
On three specific days in December 2011, Russian authorities re-
quired schools to hold exams in a poorly veiled attempt to discourage 
young people from joining protests demanding fair elections. This case 
provides an opportunity to illustrate the category of indirect threat 
in our continuum (Table 8.1). Besides the advantages of redirecting 
students, teachers, and parents away from protest, the indirect use of 
educational institutions meant that the regime could disguise its social 
control and leverage indirect threats. Missing exams (taking them or 
giving them) could result in professional reprimand, failing grades, and 
the possibility of poor future prospects. Potential movement activists 
must weigh the costs of their participation, which are not limited to 
confrontations with the police. If, however, such subterfuge remains 
concealed, authorities can spread repression and their culpability 
across various institutions, thus minimizing the dangerous attribution 
of repression at the top of the regime that might produce backfire.
Nelson (2013, 170) notes the effectiveness of what he calls “intra-
psychic wounding,” citing Emile Durkheim’s concept of the collective 
consciousness. Intrapsychic wounding involves inflicting trauma that 
undermines the “beliefs, hopes, values, and thought characteristics of 
a group.” Nelson observes that “the Middle East countries roiled by 
the Arab Spring had been controlled, for decades, by dictators who 
stifled dissent through small scale, individualized actions. People were 
frequently arrested, beaten, falsely convicted, penalized and punished, 
fired from jobs, prohibited from attending school, or raped” (171). In 
the final analysis, Nelson contends, “analytically, aggregate-induced 
wounding, rather than large scale/single massive event wounding, is 
probably the more efficient and less risky form of intrapsychic subver-
sion” (171).
Brian Martin and Truda Gray (2005, 157) note that “defamation 
actions often serve as a form of legal intimidation, suppressing free 
speech”; these actions are therefore also a form of smart repression. 
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Moreover, they note, “threats of defamation suits are more frequent 
than suits themselves, and can have the same effect. In Australia, 
where defamation laws are quite favourable to plaintiffs, defamation 
law is an especially powerful tool against free speech (Pullan 1994).” 
Targets of defamation have tactics at their disposal to counter defama-
tion suits or their threats, which Martin and Gray identify as exposing 
the action, validating the target, interpreting it as censorship, avoid-
ing or discrediting the courts, and resisting intimidation and bribery. 
Unless activists are prepared to counter defamation, they might be 
subtly subverted by it.3
All of these intimidation tactics are designed to demobilize insur-
gent or dissident campaigns without the use of overt violence, thus 
mitigating the possibility of repression backfiring. Even more subtle 
than intimidation, however, are efforts to manipulate groups or their 
individual members, often covertly.
Manipulation
Another set of demobilization techniques involves manipulating dis-
sidents and their organizations through such tactics as co-optation, 
facilitations, “demonstration elections” (including election fraud), 
information suppression, suppressing recruiting efforts, and engag-
ing in dilemma actions (creating a situation that gives individuals or 
groups a choice between two negative options). Manipulations involve 
attempts to undermine, divide, divert, or distract social movement 
organizations or their pool of potential recruits.
Selective facilitation is one strategy often used to manipulate 
movements, playing more radical and more moderate groups off of 
each other with “the selective facilitation of some groups’ claims and 
the selective repression of others” (Tarrow 2011, 209). The problem 
3. The utility of defamation in this section revolves around the ability of author-
ities to provoke fear among activists. In a later section on soft repression we note how 
defamation or stigmatization may help authorities win framing battles where the 
target is the general public.
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for governments using this tactic is that it can “push radicals into more 
sectarian forms of organization and more violent forms of action,” 
especially if there is a “decline in mass support and polarization inside 
the movement” (209). When combined with partial demobilization, it 
can even produce terrorism (della Porta 1995).
Authorities may attempt to divert or co-opt human resources 
and leadership away from social movement organizations by offering 
attractive alternative pathways, such as career moves, to address their 
social concerns within the halls of power, where power is traditionally 
believed to reside. Activists may be invited to serve on policy-making 
commissions or establish new government-funded programs. Coy and 
Hedeen (2005) explain: “Channeling refers to efforts by the dominant 
group to undermine and redirect the challenging movement’s leader-
ship and power base away from substantive challenges to the domi-
nant groups or system and toward more modest reforms” (416). Once a 
sense of progress through institutional channels has been established, 
continued access, credibility, and participation can become movement 
goals in and of themselves, a process that Coy and Hedeen call “the 
paradox of collaboration” (417). Furthermore, the movement’s former 
sense of urgency can dissipate, since the business is being taken care of 
within official institutions.
Co-optation is a frequent strategy authorities use to diffuse dis-
sent. Goldstone and Tilly (2001) explore how people in power com-
bine repression and concession simultaneously or alternately in order 
to raise the cost of dissidence and increase the rewards for collaborat-
ing with the status quo for activists or potential resisters. Of course, 
this carrot-and-stick approach has a long tradition that is a well-worn 
strategy of smart repression. The Arab states—especially Saudi Ara-
bia—used this combination to diffuse protest after the eruption of 
protests in Tunisia and Egypt in 2011. Mehran Kamrava (2012, 97) 
argues that “at the same time as GCC states have resorted to height-
ened levels of repression to ensure their political survival, they have 
also sought to strengthen their rule by pumping massive amounts of 
money into the economy.” The Saudis spent $130 billion to give civil 
servants two months’ extra salaries, built half a million additional 
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units of low-income housing, and increased their financial support for 
religious organization (cf. MacFarquhar 2011).
Nelson (2013, 168) identifies another manipulation tactic against 
social movements as “resource depletion,” which is the opposite of 
what movement scholars call resource mobilization. This, Nelson 
says, can take the form of:
•  targeting the money, machines, and mobility of a group;
•  seizing assets or property (e.g., by filing civil litigation that re-
quires a group to spend limited resources defending themselves);
• introducing computer viruses; or
•  “accidentally” blocking a car to prevent transportation to an
event, creating what Nelson calls a “petit failure” of the movement.
Authorities will often suppress information flow among insurgents, 
especially by blocking access to the Internet or cell phones. Dubai 
hosts an annual TeleStrategies conference where American and Euro-
pean companies show their latest technologies for blocking websites 
and targeting web traffic (Nelson 2013, 164–65). Authorities can also 
“suppress recruiting efforts,” according to Nelson (165), by identifying 
situations in which potential recruits become vulnerable to movement 
recruitment, such as life turning points like divorce and unemploy-
ment. This tactic is enhanced with subversion methods like reduc-
ing recruiting opportunities: authorities can reduce contact between 
activists and potential recruits by physically removing opportunities 
for them to meet, through house arrest, communications blockages, 
or actually relocating them, if possible (165–66). Of course, this type 
of repression can move well beyond simple manipulation into intimi-
dation or even milder forms of direct violence (like arrests).
“Dilemma actions” are tactics that set up one’s opponents so that 
they are forced to choose between two unattractive alternatives. Long 
a favorite of movement activists, these tactics were conceptualized by 
Lakey (1973, 103–8; cf. Lakey 1987) as early as 1968, when he described 
a dilemma action deployed by activists campaigning against chemical 
weapons who repeatedly tried to plant a pine tree at Edgewood Arse-
nal in Maryland. Each time the military authorities arrested activists 
and their tree, they violated norms about the value of life and nature 
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and highlighted the activists’ framing of the arsenal as place of death 
and destruction. After several confrontations, the military authorities 
chose to allow a tree to be planted, consenting to the permanent pres-
ence of the activists’ frame. As Lakey (1973, 107) explains, “in symbol 
language, when the tree said life, all Edgewood could say back was 
death, no matter how daintily it picked its phrases.”
Though Lakey introduced the concept of dilemma demonstra-
tion, it was not until Sørensen and Martin’s (2014) article that it 
received systematic treatment. They devoted attention to how move-
ment activists can choreograph dilemma actions, but their approach 
is instructive as to how such dilemmas can be set up by authorities 
as well. Authorities may, for example, place nonviolent activists in a 
dilemma by calling for civility and calm. To the extent that meth-
ods of nonviolent disruption are used, the activists may become vul-
nerable to charges of having violated their own principles. If they 
abandon their strategy, they potentially lessen their impact and lose 
momentum, and the authorities will have successfully demobilized 
the movement.
Another manipulative technique identified by Nelson (2013, 169) 
is what he calls “divisive disruption,” which may involve using agent 
provocateurs who infiltrate the movement and foment violent actions, 
or attack “the trust among a group’s leaders, perhaps through rumor, a 
planted letter (or e-mail), or even a photoshopped picture placing one 
or more in compromising circumstances.”
Finally, censorship is another time-honored demobilization tac-
tic. The Roman Catholic Church developed the most elaborate such 
institutional mechanism, the Index of Forbidden Books. The problem 
was that when a book was placed on the index, its sales soared! The 
backfire was so acute that, at one point, a cardinal even put the Index 
of Forbidden Books itself on the index!
Soft Repression
Repression includes hegemonic practices that undermine dissent 
through counterframing and propaganda. In a chapter on soft repres-
sion, Myra Marx Ferree (2005) identifies three forms of cultural 
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subversion by non-state targets of social movements: ridicule, stigma, 
and silencing. She usefully critiques a long tendency among social move-
ment scholars to focus on states as the targets of social movements, and 
she distinguishes the strategies of state versus non-state actors (such 
as corporations), with the latter less likely to use the state’s methods 
of physical force retaliation but nonetheless act against movements to 
defend their interests (cf. Linden and Klandermans 2006, 213–28).
Whereas hard repression involves the mobilization of force to con-
trol or crush oppositional action through the use or threat of violence, 
soft repression involves the mobilization of nonviolent means to silence 
or eradicate oppositional ideas. “The distinguishing criterion of soft 
repression,” Marx Ferree (2005, 141) contends, “is the collective mobi-
lization of power, albeit in nonviolent forms and often highly informal 
ways, to limit and exclude ideas and identities from the public forum.” 
Our concept of smart repression is similar, and for our purposes, the 
nonviolent aspect of soft repression feeds into these methods’ capaci-
ties to avoid backfire. Indeed, there has been increasing interest in 
what Joseph Nye (1990, 2004) dubbed “soft power,” that is, “the ability 
to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or pay-
ments” (2004, x).
A parallel development emerged in the Iraq and Afghanistan 
conflicts under the direction of General David Petraeus, with a shift 
toward counterinsurgency intelligence (COIN) as a focus of US mili-
tary operations, which a COIN strategist says is “75 percent hearts 
and minds, just 25 percent combat” (Kaplan 2014, 89). Recognizing 
the potential backfire of an intimidating and violent military pres-
ence countering an insurgency, the COIN approach measured success 
not by “how many enemy troops you kill but how many townspeople 
or villagers are spontaneously providing intelligence about where the 
enemy is, . . . how many community leaders openly support the gov-
ernment . . . and how much spontaneous economic activity is going on 
in a town (reflecting the sense that it’s safe to go out on the streets)” 
(Kaplan 2014, 89).
Women’s movements are demobilized, Marx Ferree (2004) notes, 
in three ways that raise the cost of becoming associated with identities 
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or groups that challenge the status quo. Ridicule occurs on an inter-
personal level in daily life as individuals are mocked and degraded as 
the boundaries of privilege become reinscribed for all present. Stigma 
refers to a broader dynamic of devaluing groups via negative stereo-
types that undermines attempts to maintain a movement and recruit 
new members. Silencing occurs as mass media outlets deliberately make 
biased decisions about what speech to allow and which to exclude. In 
the process, movement arguments become lost, and the urgency and 
salience of the movement declines in the eyes of potential participants.
The media constitute a particularly important platform where 
framing contests between the regime and the movement play out in 
public. The regime obviously has the upper hand in most instances, 
because officials usually have easier access to the media than do resist-
ers. It is also, paradoxically, the space where resistance becomes visible 
precisely when the regime tries to crack down on protesters or the 
media itself. Without the media, the backfire effect would not take 
hold. Consequently, authorities may aim to choreograph protest events 
covered by the media in ways that silence or distract from dissent.
In 2002, the United States Office of Presidential Advance (2002) 
within the Bush administration released a Presidential Advance Man-
ual with instructions on how to minimize any disruptions created by 
protesters, since the president had been hounded by them whenever 
he made public appearances. The version obtained by the American 
Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) was heavily redacted, but it empha-
sized preventing demonstrators from coming near an event where the 
president might appear. “Rally squads,” preorganized counterdemon-
strators, would surround and drown out any demonstrators who man-
aged to get through the elaborate screening system into the venue. 
Moreover, the manual emphasizes (in bold face): “Remember—avoid 
physical contact with demonstrators!” (35). Event organizers are advised 
that they should “not do anything or say anything that might result in 
physical harm to the demonstrators. Before taking action, the advance 
person must decide if the solution would cause more negative publicity 
than if the demonstrators were simply left alone” (35). The next thirty 
pages of the document are redacted and so do not appear in the version 
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released to the ACLU, perhaps to prevent readers from learning their 
smart antidemonstrator tactics.
The media also plays a key role in the construction and main-
tenance of hegemony, or latent repression, by repeating the images, 
ideas, and talking points provided by elites in order to construct what 
Gramsci calls “spontaneous consensus” (Gramsci 1992–1996). A strik-
ing example of this process was revealed in November 2011, when the 
MSNBC program UP w/ Chris Hayes obtained a memo from a lobby-
ing firm, Clark Lytle Geduldig & Cranford (Geduldig et al. 2011), to 
the American Bankers Association. The unsolicited memo proposed 
that the firm assist the association by conducting “survey research and 
message testing, opposition research, targeted social media monitor-
ing, coalition planning, and advertising creative and placement strat-
egy development.” The opposition research component was offered to 
“identify opportunities to construct fact-based negative narratives of 
the OWS [Occupy Wall Street] for high impact media placement to 
expose the backers behind this movement.” The lobbyists surmised, 
“If we can show they have the same cynical motivation as a politi-
cal opponent it will undermine their credibility in a profound way.” 
In this case, negative media representations were intended to make 
the Occupy movement less palatable to Republican politicians, who 
might embrace it under pressure from the populist Tea Party move-
ment. The ploy might fall neatly under Marx Ferree’s (2005) “stigma” 
category of soft repression.
A general reading of media coverage of the Occupy movement sug-
gests other similar attempts to portray its participants as marginal and 
undesirable. In the context of standoffs between police and protesters 
in cities across the country, we believe this framing battle was related 
to the probability of repression backfiring as municipal authorities 
struggled to deal with encampments on public and private property. 
Reporting characterized Occupy activists as lazy, unhygienic, home-
less, and strung out. Whether these portrayals can be traced to the 
governmental authorities who were under pressure to end protests and 
clear camps interests us, though as the lobbying firm’s memo suggests, 
the source of negative representations in the media can be shadowy.
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In some cases, authorities can simply exclude the media from im-
portant contentious events. For example, in a coordinated effort to 
demobilize the Occupy movement in November 2011, eighteen US 
mayors held a conference call with federal officials, according to Oak-
land Mayor Jean Quan (“Occupy Wall Street” 2011). A Justice Depart-
ment official reportedly told a reporter that federal law enforcement 
officials advised US cities to use riot gear to intimidate the protesters, 
but Ellis claimed, “the FBI reportedly advised on press relations, with 
one presentation suggesting that any moves to evict protesters be co-
ordinated for a time when the press was the least likely to be present” 
(Wells 2011). Under the FBI’s advice, movement voices would, by de-
sign, be silenced and repression unreported.
Nelson (2013, 168) identifies “expertly directed, incessant pro-
active manipulation of media” as a key tactic for subverting a social 
movement. This may involve
•  taking control of media away from the movement preemptively,
using media experts;
•  manipulating the media “to cast disparaging light on the move-
ment” in order to damage its constructed public image, and alter-
natively portraying the protested organization as wholesome and
worthwhile;
•  denying protesters the legitimization provided by meetings with
public or institutional officials (if you have to have meetings,
“they must be off-camera, unannounced, and, if suspected, be
neither confirmed or denied,”);
•  using subversion efforts that are both proactive and rapidly
reactive.
The media can also be used to stigmatize dissident groups, their mem-
bers, or their leadership. In his discussion of this tactic of stigmatiza-
tion, Nelson (2013, 168–69) cites Erving Goffman’s (2009) work on 
“spoiled identity” as providing clues as to how to discredit a movement 
by besmirching its public image.
We appreciate Marx Ferree’s (2005) broadening of the study of 
repression, and we believe (as her article allows) that the strategies she 
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attributes to non-state actors are not exclusive of state authorities, who 
of course also wield security forces against social movement activists. 
The various framing strategies that soft repression represents may 
also be considered “smart” in our formulation because they can take 
place nonviolently in a range of contexts (e.g., press conferences, news 
outlets, schools, churches), away from the sturm und drang of street 
protest. More importantly, they can precede direct repression and 
make it seem better justified and thus less likely to backfire. Nelson 
(2013, 166) notes that authorities can “develop attractive alternatives” 
in order to divert potential recruits from movement participation to 
something less threatening to the status quo. One example Nelson 
puts forth is what he calls “reverse honeypots operations.” Infiltra-
tors in a movement can volunteer to set up websites that would then 
include tiny hyperlinks in the text that would go undetected but cause 
Google to link the pages to a movement organization, manipulating 
Google searches so that other sites would be more likely to show up in 
a search, diverting potential activists from the movement’s site (166). 
Another tactic of movement subversion Nelson identifies is tempt-
ing members to leave a movement by making emotional appeals, for 
example, with an alternative that distracts people from movement par-
ticipation, diverting them into other activities. To counter a radical 
animal rights group, for example, its members might be recruited to 
engage in rescuing orphaned puppies.
Nelson (2013, 166–67) calls a more aggressive version of this tac-
tic “reverse recruiting,” which exposes participants to demoralizing 
information such as “contradictory evidence or beliefs” to draw them 
away from the movement. Instead of simply blocking information flow, 
authorities can disseminate misinformation or disinformation. This 
tactic might also involve “disseminating believable disinformation” 
or misinformation that discredits movement leaders or weakens the 
group, thus increasing personal risks for, and costs of, participation.
Perhaps a more subtle manipulation is what Nelson (2013, 167) 
identifies as operationalizing “secure/faux concessions” that make it ap-
pear that the movement has succeeded when it has not. Nelson warns, 
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however (providing an example from Cornell University, whose al-
leged deception was discovered by protesters), that “the truth of things 
must remain a carefully guarded secret,” if this tactic is to succeed.
Hegemony
The most advantageous type of repression for a regime is that which 
does not look like repression at all, what we might call the “latent repres-
sion” of hegemony, as Antonio Gramsci (1992–1996) has described it. 
Overt repression of the sort that most often results in backfire is often 
a consequence of the failure of more “soft” or subtle means of repres-
sion. As Bates (1975, 353) notes, “to the extent that the intellectuals fail 
to create hegemony, the ruling class falls back on the state’s coercive 
apparatus which disciplines those who do not ‘consent,’” and which 
is “constructed for all society in anticipation of moments of crisis of 
command . . . when spontaneous consensus declines.”
In the previous subsection, we addressed how authorities and elites 
try to manage their own repression in the service of protecting their le-
gitimacy that is often won through the manufacture of consent (Her-
man and Chomsky [1988] 2011). Postmodern theorists such as Michel 
Foucault (1980) have revealed the subtle and nuanced ways in which 
elites wield power by instituting and privileging narratives that be-
come so deeply internalized that they preempt alternative narratives 
and make the thinkable unthinkable or out of reach of critical thought 
(cf. Gaventa 1980).
Herbert Marcuse (1974, 94) makes a similar point in Eros and Civi-
lization: society defends against threats with “a strengthening of con-
trols not so much over the instincts as over consciousness, which, if 
left free, might recognize the work of repression in the bigger and 
better satisfaction of needs.” Dissent is co-opted, and people self cen-
sor their protest, channeling their discontent into consumerism; here, 
there is no need to send in the troops to quell demonstrations because 
potential insurgents are busy shopping, engaging in purchased leisure 
activities, or working to make the incomes required to “fulfill them-
selves” with purchases that reinforce the robustness of the very sys-
tem that stirs their discontent. This may be the “smartest” form of 
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repression of all, the hegemony that we identify on the far right end of 
our spectrum of repression.
Regimes often rely on nationalism to connect political agendas 
with deeply held collective identities. The state becomes “father,” 
“mother,” “home,” and to challenge it either seems incongruent or pro-
duces shame and guilt. Under the most effective hegemonic regimes, 
challenging authorities and elites rarely even occurs to enough people 
to mobilize resistance that would provoke resistance and backfire. Our 
focus has been on how authorities deal with those who publicly and 
nonviolently challenge the status quo, but we include hegemony in 
our continuum of demobilization (Table 8.1) because it represents the 
most insidious form of demobilization and is often a product of suc-
cessful soft repression. Hegemonic power is established throughout 
a population, but it also presents challenges for activists, who are not 
immune to the seduction of going along to get along.
Conclusion
One of the keys to the success of a social movement campaign seems 
to be its ability to manage repression, trying to enhance the poten-
tial of its backfiring to the benefit of the movement. The challenge is 
always significant, as people in power who are trying to demobilize a 
movement usually have more resources, more access to the media, and 
sometimes even some legitimacy among the regular populace. They 
at least have the ability to make people fear them (see Popovic, Mili-
vojevic, and Djinovic 2006), if not love them, as the policy Machiavelli 
advised the prince to follow suggests.
The task of repression management is even more daunting when 
the repression is “smart.” If it is more subtle rather than overtly violent 
and brutal, or if the regime has sufficiently convinced others that it is 
legitimate and the dissenters unworthy, or that the cost of insurgency 
is simply too high, then managing it becomes more complicated. In 
our effort to untangle the paradox of repression, we have found smart 
repression to be particularly puzzling, and this has been a prelimi-
nary effort to understand how regimes might employ it and dissenters 
might counter it.
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Some might argue that methods of demobilization toward the 
right end of our continuum (Table 8.1), such as media strategies and 
hegemony, do not amount to repression but rather constitute at-
tempts to undermine and demobilize a movement before the need for 
repression arises. Alternatively, others, such as Marx Ferree, consider 
these more cultural strategies to be repression in a different sphere. 
Whether the police are trying to intimidate or beat protesters out 
of physical public space, or whether spokespersons are seeking to 
“exclude ideas and identities from the public forum,” power is being 
wielded for social control and to resist challengers. The former posi-
tion perhaps defines repression too narrowly, while under the latter 
all contention becomes either repression or resistance (cf. Goodwin 
and Jasper 2012).
Regardless of whether nonviolent attempts to undermine chal-
lengers amount to repression, such efforts still bear on more tradi-
tional understandings of repression. The framing battles in which 
authorities and social movements engage shape the cultural field of 
public expectations and legitimacy where backfire takes place. Each 
side wants to shift the threshold across which the paradox of repres-
sion is triggered. Authorities want to keep repression (physical or cul-
tural) under the radar as much as possible and to portray challengers 
as illegitimate or in some way deserving of overt repression, if the 
latter becomes necessary. Social movement activists want to delegiti-
mize authorities and reveal repression and injustices so that dramatic 
instances of repression are more likely to become tipping points at 
which backfire occurs. In short, each side wants to prepare the ground 
on which repression occurs.
Perhaps one of the reasons the study of repression has focused on 
physical acts of intimidation and violence by the state is because these 
are dramatic events that capture press attention and titillate popu-
lar audiences. Smart repression is “smart” because it aims to either 
head off confrontation by making mobilization more difficult through 
hegemonic strategies of silencing and reeducation or by making direct 
repression less outrageous and thus less likely to provoke movement 
organizing and nonviolent action. Either approach makes backfire 
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more complicated. In these framing contests, both authorities and 
activists seek to shift the threshold at which the paradox of repression 
is activated in their favor.
Understanding the concept of smart repression can help nonvio-
lent activists reflect more clearly on the impulses and fears that deter 
them from taking action, and it can guide them in choreographing 
actions that highlight violations of civil liberties, even when they do 
not necessarily involve bodily repression. (For example, some activists 
cover their mouths with tape to focus public attention on ways in which 
some citizens and their concerns are silenced.) Maintaining nonvio-
lent discipline remains paramount under conditions of smart repres-
sion in order to illustrate a clear contrast between the legitimacy of 
people power and authoritarian attempts to silence democratic voices. 
Not surprisingly, social movement activists have developed their own 
strategies for raising the likelihood of repression backfiring. Although 
the elite may have more resources at its command, it often lacks the 
creativity or the versatility of a nonviolent civil resistance. Nonvio-
lent activists have shown a growing aptitude (perhaps bolstered by the 
increasing availability and use of social media and media production 
tools) for engaging in creative framing battles that make repression 
more likely to backfire on authorities.
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